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which require congressional action. Apart from these considerations, it is un-
likely as a matter of practical politics that the executive would develop any
broad plan for determining title to large amounts of property without con-
gressional concurrence. Thus, joint executive-legislative federal action ap-
pears the only logical and feasible method of resolving the difficulties in this
field.
A beginning was made in the case of the Soviet Union. The executive ob-
tained the Litvinov Assignment, and Congress authorized the President to ap-
point a commissioner, apparently looking toward a distribution of the funds
collected under the Assignment." 8 Executive and legislative actions must
meet the standards of the Fifth Amendment," 9 but this presents no insuperable
difficulties. Congress and the executive should be able to work out a set of
rules defining the right of the various types of persons and property affected
by delayed recognition.!o ° Legislative-executive regulation of this field on the
federal level, is clearly preferable to the shifting, ex post facto determinations of
our many-headed judicial system.
ASSIGNABILITY OF EMPLOYEES' COVENANTS
NOT TO COMPETE
Covenants of a vendor not to compete with the purchaser of his business and
of an employee not to compete with his employer subsequent to his term of
employment do not fall within the category of restraints of trade which are
void., A desire to facilitate sales of businesses and the hiring of workers has
typically been said to account for the enforceability of covenants ancillary to
x*8 53 Stat. 1199 (i939). This commissioner was supposed to prove all United States claims
against the Soviet Union, but the money to pay his salary was never appropriated and the
claims never proved. The money collected under the Litvinov Assignment is still in the United
States Treasury. Private Communication from M.P. Shaner, Assistant Legal Adviser to the
State Department, Feb. 28, i951.
X9 See discussion notes 77 and 8o supra.
x"o The freezing and trade restriction orders, note 98 supra, are a desirable prerequisite to
full regulation of this problem.
'All contracts in restraint of trade, even if ancillary, at one time were void. It is certain
that if such covenants were contained in a bond by which the obligor undertook to forego the
exercise of a trade, they were unenforceable. In Dier's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, pl. 26 (i414), the
court remarked that if the plaintiff were there, he would go to prison until he paid a fine to
the King. The policy that made it desirable that laborers work at some gainful occupation
because of the manpower shortage occasioned by the Black Death, dictated that such per-
sons should not be restrained from working. The Statute of Laborers passed in 1349 required
every able-bodied man under sixty years of age, not engaged in a trade, tilling land or other-
wise profitably engaged "to serve him that doth require him, or else be committed to the
gaol." 23 Edw. III c. I (1349). As the population increased and labor became more mobile,
the policy changed. The leading case of Mitchell v. Reynolds, i P. Wins. ii (K.B., 17i1),
decided that ancillary restraints were valid, at least if partial in their scope. For a general
survey of this subject, consult 5 Williston, Contracts §§ 1634, 1635 (rev. ed., 1937); Dietz, A
Political and Social History of England 57-58 (3d ed., 1946).
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such transactions.2 In view of this rationale, these covenants will be unen-
forceable if there is no main lawful transaction, or, there being such a transac-
tion, if the restraint goes beyond what the court considers to be reasonable3
Since restrictive covenants are contrary to a broader policy fimly imbedded
in our institutions-the promotion of competition-every extension of their
scope should harmonize with that policy. In this light, the question here is
whether the employee's covenant is, as some courts have held, so similar to
that of the vendor that it too is assignable.
With respect to the vendor's covenant, there is little, if any, dissent from
the notion that it may be enforced by one who purchases the business from
the original covenantee, even in the absence of express words of assignability.4
A guarantee that the vendor of a business will not trade on the good will sold
along with t e tangible assets of the business is said to be indispensable for an
effective transfer of the good will. Courts have had no difficulty in saying that
for this reason the vendor's covenant is tantamount to an asset of the enter-
prise, and like other assets assignable when the business is resold.5
Greater difficulty is encountered in determining whether the employee's
covenant should be similarly assignable. Many of the cases holding such cove-
nants enforceable by the purchaser of a business do not settle the assignability
question because the employee continued to work for a time after the sale of
the business. Courts in such cases were able to seize upon "ratification" or
"recognition" of the purported assignment as a basis for restraining the
employee. 6 This result, however, is frequently supported by assertions that,
2 Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 223 S.W. 2d 144, 1si (Mo. App., 1949); Carpenter,
Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, 76 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 244, 254 (1928).
3 See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 282 (C.A. 6th, i898), aff'd
175 U.S. 211 (1899), where Judge Taft defined a reasonable restraint as one "ancillary to the
main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the convenantee in the enjoyment
of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from the dangers of an unjust use of
these fruits by another party."
4 Sickles v. Lauman, 185 Iowa 37, x69 N.W. 670 (i918), annotated in 4 A.L.R. 1073 (1918);
2 Williston, Contracts § 412 (rev. ed., i937).
s Representative language is found in Francisco v. Smith, 143 N.Y. 488, 493, 38 N.E.
98o, 98r (1894), where the court observed: "Such an agreement is a valuable right in connec-
tion with the business it was designed to protect, and, going with the business it may be as-
signed, and the assignee may enforce it just as the assignor could have enforced it if he had
retained the business." Accord: Coker v. Richey, io4 Ore. 14, 202 Pac. 551 (1921); Langendorf
United Bakeries, Inc. v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 2d 150, 53 P. 2d 363 (1936);'Assignability of Con-
tracts in Restraint of Trade, 79 LJ. 219 (I935).
6 Nelson v. Woods, 2o5 Ga. 295, 53 S.E. 2d 227 (I949); Blaser v. Linen Service Corp. of
Texas, 135 S.W. 2d 509 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939); Nat'l Linen Service Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga.
136, I75 S.E. 460 (1934); cf. Linen Service Corp. of Texas v. Myers, 128 S.W. 2d 850 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1939)- Contra are two cases holding that merely continuing to work for the new
employer does not imply assent to the assignment of the employment contract, including the
restrictive covenant: Ave. Z Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Yarmush, 129 App. Div. 427, 221
N.Y. Supp. 506 (S. Ct., 1927), aff'd 22o App. Div. 740, 221 N.Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dep't, 1927);
Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 300 S.W. 107 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927).
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even in the absence of "ratification," the employee's covenant would be assign-
able by analogy to the vendor's covenant.7 A recent decision of the Court of
Common Pleas of Ohio, Safier's, Inc. v Bialer,8 illustrates the way these two
lines of argument can be combined to enforce the employee's covenant in favor
of the purchaser of the business. In that case, while the court decided that the
restrictive covenant was a "transferable asset" and so was enforceable by the
plaintiff,9 it was said, in addition, that even if it were not so assignable, a
"novation" occurred when defendant announced his intention to continue in
the business.
It is evident that if the employee consents to an attempted assignment of his
employment contract, he can not subsequently object that the contract could
not be assigned. Such a transaction, however, is not an assignment, but at
most is a new contract between the employee and the purchaser of the busi-
ness.'0 In Pestel Mfilk Co. v. Model Dairy Products Co.," it was held that where
employees refused to sign a new employment contract containing a restrictive
covenant similar to that in the original contracts of employment, they could
not be bound by ratification although they had continued to work for the pur-
chaser of the business for over half a year." Such restraint in applying the rati-
fication concept is unusual; many courts hold that merely continuing to work
for the new owner implies "ratification" of the assignment of the employment
contract.' 3 This looseness is well illustrated by the Bialer case. The employee
elson v. Woods, 2o5 Ga. 295, 53 S.E. 2d 227 (1949); Blaser v. Linen Service Corp. of
Texas, i35 S.W. 2d 5o9 (Tex. Civ. App., 1939); Nat'l Linen Service Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga.
136
, 
175 S.E. 46o (1934).
93 IN.E. 2d 734 (C.P. Ohio, ig5o) (Safier's, Inc. brought an action against Bialer to enjoin
him from violating a covenant not to compete so far as customers of the employer were in-
volved,which was included in the employment contract between him and his former employer.)
9 Ibid., at 736-37. While the court here seemed to rely to some extent on words of assign-
ability in the employment contract, where a court is hostile to the enforcement of these
covenants by assignees, such words will be given little weight. Thus, it has been stated that
"the contract was not made assignable by use of the terms 'assigns,' as same involved a
relation of personal confidence which repelled the idea that.., any person other than the
one named in the contract ... should exercise the same." Oak Cliff Delivery Co. v. Peterson,
300 S.W. 107, io (Tex. Civ. App., 1927). Accord: Paige v. Faure, 229 IN.Y. 114, 127 N.E.
89S (1920); Montgomery v. De Picot, 153 Cal. 509, 96 Pac. 305 (i9o8).
'0 4 Page, Law of Cohtracts § 2258 (2d ed., 1920).
" 52 N.E. 2d 65i (Ohio App., 2943).
12 Pestel Milk Co. v. 'odel Dairy Products Co., 52 N.E. 2d 65i (Ohio App., 2943). It
should be noted that Pestel Company had frequently solicited these route men to enter into a
contract similar to that which they had had with their former employer. To the court, this
indicated that plaintiff knew it could not restrain the solicitation of customers without a
definite agreement. Another circumstance operating against plaintiff was the fact that the
limitation related to a period of six months after the termination of the contract with the'
former employer, and this had already expired at the time the injunction was sought. One
writer has used this case for the proposition that the employee's covenant not to compete can-
not be transferred to the buyer of the business without the consent of the employee. i Callman,
Law of Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § 64 .4(b) at 802 (194S).
'S Authorities cited note 6 supra; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Stuart, 134 Neb. 413, 278 NA.W. 827
(1938) (semble); Chapin v. Longworth, 32 Ohio St. 421 (1877) (semble).
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had said that "he would be on the job Monday morning" but changed his mind
and never actually worked for the new employer; yet the words alone were held
sufficient to bind the employee.'4 Plainly, it would not be good contract law
to say that the "mere talking over" of employment is sufficient to bind the
employee to a contract of employment, including a covenant not to compete.' 5
Less ready resort to the ratification fiction would compel courts more
squarely to face the question whether the covenant of an employee not to
compete is assignable with the sale of the business. That is nbt to say that then
markedly different results would follow, for in the few cases in which this ques-
tion has been raised in a "pure" form, the covenant not to compete has been
held assignable. 6 Thus, where the employee left the business before it was sold
and opened up his own shop, an English court held that the purchaser of the
business could enforce the covenant which the employee had made with his
employer since it was "part of the good-will" of the business.' 7 Similarly, an
American court has held that the purchaser of a business could enforce the
restrictive covenant of an employee not to compete or solicit orders despite the
fact that the new owner had, upon acquiring the business, fired the defendant.' 8
Implicit in these decisions is the notion that the employee's covenant is an
asset of the business, severable from the employee's agreement to work. 9
Under any other conception of the covenant, assignability would be impossible
because where there is a personal contract, such as a contract of employment,
ordinarily neither party can assign his rights under it without the consent of
the other.20 Refusing to accept the view evidently adopted by most American
'4 See Safier's, Inc. v. Bialer, 93 N.E. 2d 734, 737 (C.P. Ohio, 195o), where the court stated:
"If he accepted employment, even though he did not function, he cannot equitably change his
mind and promptly proceed to raid the 'good will' customers of his former employer in violation
of his solemn contractual obligation to refrain from so doing."
'S i Williston, Contracts § 39 (rev. ed., 1937).
16 Torrington Creamery, Inc. v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515, 12 A. 2d 780 (1940); Benwell v.
Inns, 24 Beavan 307 (Ch., 1857); Jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L.T. 335 (C.A., 1883); Baines v.
Geary, 35 Ch. D. 154 (1887); Showell v. Winkup, 6o T.L.R. 389 (Ch., 1889); Fitch v. Dewes,
[1921] 2 A.C. i58; Express Dairy Co. v. Jackson, 142 L.T. 231 (K.B., 1929). The English
cases seem to be based on dicta originating in an early case where, in considering whether a
lifetime restraint on an employee was reasonable as between the original parties, it was said
that if the restraint would be valid as long as the master owned the business, it "should be
allowed to continue if the master sells the trade." Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438, 455
(K.B., 1837).
'7jacoby v. Whitmore, 49 L.T. 335 (C.A., 1883).
zs Torrington Creamery, Inc. v. Davenport, 1-26 Conn. 515, 12 A. 2d 780 (940).
19 In Nat'l Linen Service Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 142-43, 175 S.E. 460, 464 (1934),
the court observed: "[WVe are not concerned with any effort to assign the employee's agree-
ment to work for the employing corporation. It is only the restrictive covenant whereby the
employee agreed not to engage in the same line of business, and not to work for any other per-
son engaged in such business for the period of one year within a stipulated territory, that
calls for any adjudication...
2oThomas-Bonner Co. v. Hooven, Owens & Rentschler Co., 284 Fed. 377 (S.D. Ohio,
1920); Paige v. Faure, 229 N.Y. 114, 127 N.E. 898 (1920); Ave. Z Wet Wash Laundry Co. v.
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courts that the employee's covenant is a severable asset of the enterprise, a
Scottish court observed that since a contract of service could not be assigned
because of its personal nature, it was difficult to see how a particular provision
of such a contract, the restrictive covenant, could be assigned.21 That it is the
covenant as a separate asset that is being assigned is further demonstrated by
the reliance which courts place upon cases involving vendors' covenants, the
assignability of which has been justified by calling them assets. No American
case has been found to uphold the assignability of the employee's covenant that
does not either directly or indirectly rely upon vendor's-covenant cases.-
Failure to distinguish between the employee's and the vendor's covenants
in regard to their assignability is largely a consequence of a similar confusion
concerning their enforceability independent of assignability. While occasion-
ally courts are constrained not to enforce the employee's covenant because
of the likelihood that it resulted from an inequality of bargaining power, the
majority of American courts overlook the fundamental difference in the policies
which presently validate these particular restrictive covenants.2 3
The vendor's covenant has been sustained within limits set by the "rule of
reason" because it makes for easier alienability of businesses.24 Early English
courts sustained the employee's covenant for a similar reason, namely, an in-
Yarmush, 129 App. Div. 427, 221 N.Y. Supp. 506 (S.Ct., 1927); Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v.
Peterson, 3o0 S.W. 107 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927); 1 Williston, Contracts § 42X (rev. ed., 1937);
4 Page, Law of Contracts §§ 2251, 2255 (2d ed., 1920).
2! Berlitz School of Languages, Ltd. v. Duchene, 6 Scottish Court of Sessions 18i (i9o3).
" The court in National Linen Service Co. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175 S.E. 46o (1934)
relied on its prior decisions in Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 26 S.E. 71 (i896) and Legg v.
Hood, 154 Ga. 28, 113 S.E. 642 (1922), both of which involved the assignability of the vendor's
covenant. The Clower case in turn was influential in Jones v. Primrose Dry Cleaning Co.,
i8i Ga. 1O3, 181 S.E. 577 (1935), in Blaser v. Linen Service Corp. of Texas, 135 S.W. 2d 5o9
(Tex. Civ. App., 1939), and in Nelson v. Woods, 2o5 Ga. 295, 53 S.E. 2d 227 (i949). Tor-
rington Creamery, Inc. v. Davenport, 126 Conn. 515, 12 A. 2d 780 (i94o) relied on Francisco
v. Smith, 143 N.Y. 488, 38 N.E. 918 (1894), a vendor's covenant case. For good measure, the
Bialer decision relied on four of the aforementioned cases, but did not consider the two Ameri-
can cases which have clearly refused to sever the employee's covenant from the employment
contract, Oak Cliff Ice Delivery Co. v. Peterson, 30o S.W. 107 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927) and
Ave. Z Wet Wash Laundry Co. v. Yarmush, 129 App. Div. 427, 221 N.Y. Supp. 5o6 (S. Ct.,
1927), aff'd 22o App. Div. 740, 221 N.Y. Supp. 788 (2d Dep't, 1927).
23 Consult 5 Williston, Contracts § 1643 (rev. ed., 1937): "If it is rightful to protect a busi-
ness when it is purchased it should be lawful to protect an established business from injury
by an employee, unless circumstances of great hardship exist. The ultimate question should
be the same in both cases,-what is necessary for the protection of the promisee's rights and
is not injurious to the public." For authority in accord see: May v. Young, x25 Conn. i, 2 A.
2d 385 (1938); Fink & Sons, Inc. v. Goldberg, ioi N.J. Eq. 644, 139 AtI. 4o8 (1927); Eureka
Laundry Co. v. Long, 146 Wis. 205, 131 N.W. 412 (191i). Consult Cowan, Covenants Not to
Compete After Termination of Employment, 5 Peabody L. Rev. 79, 82 (1941); Validity and
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Contracts of Employment, 31 Iowa L. Rev. 249
(946). But see Rest., Contracts § 535, Comment (a), (b) (1932).
24 Authorities cited note 5 supra;
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terest in enabling the craftsman to sell his services. Under the prevailing ap-
prenticeship system, the employer usually gave training as well as wages, and
it was felt that he was entitled to assure himself freedom from the competition
of skill he himself had created. 25 With the increasing use of mass-production
methods and the corresponding decline in the skilled trades, the early justifica-
tion lost much of its force. More and more employees came to their employers
either needing no special skill to do the work expected of them, or already hav-,
ing acquired the training needed from public and private educational institu-
tions which became increasingly available to them. 26 This social change pro-
duced a corresponding change in the English law regarding employees' cove-
nants. It was observed by an English court in 1920 that
[ciurrent opinion on the relations between employers and employed has moved rapidly
in recent years, and thus it is that the House of Lords... took the opportunity in 19 1327
... to examine the whole problem afresh, with the result that the supreme tribunal
.. has now placed upon the permissibility of such covenants a limit which the general
interest... had not previously seemed to require.8
In America this social change is reflected in statutes of five states declaring
employee's restrictive covenants void, 9 and by a common-law growth in a simi-
2S A covenant not to compete in consideration of training to be received frequently was the
only condition on which the employer would give the training the employee desired. Consult
Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735 (C.P., 1831); Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438 (K.B., 1837);
Mallan v. May, Ir M. & W. 652 (Ex., r843); Oppenheim, Cases on Federal Anti-Trust Laws 2
(1948).
26 Consult Enforceability of Contracts Not To Compete After a Term of Employment, 28
Col. L. Rev. 8i (X928).
27 The court was referring to Mason v. Provident Clothing & Supply Co., [19131 A.C. 724.
2'Attwood v. Lamont, [1920] 3 K.B. 571, 581-582. In Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby,
[1916] i A.C. 688, 702, the court described the limit of the employee's right to protection: "He
[the employer] is undoubtedly entitled to have his interest in his trade secrets protected, such
as secret processes of manufacture, which may be of vast value.... He is also entitled not to
have his old customers by solicitation or such other means enticed away from him. But free-
dom from all competition per se apart from these things, however lucrative it might be to him,
he is not to be protected against. He must be prepared to encounter that even at the hands of a
former employee." For a synopsis of the English law on this point, see Dix, The Law Relating
to Competitive Trading x69-74 (1938).
29 Cal. Business & Professions Code § ,66oo (Deering, 1949); Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 28.61-
28.67 (Henderson, 1938); N.D. Rev. Code § 9-o8o6 (i943); Okla. Stat. tit. 15 § 217 (194);
S.D. Code § io.o7o6 (1939).
The statutes, in words or substance, provide that every contract by which anyone is re-
strained from practicing a lawful profession, or engaging in business of any kind, otherwise
than is provided by other accompanying statutes which make exceptions in the cases of one
selling the good will of a business or of partner or partners anticipating dissolution of a partner-
ship, is to that extent void. See Miller Laboratories, Inc. v. Griffin, 2oo Okla. 398, 194 P. 2d
877 (1948), which construes the Oklahoma statute.
The South Dakota code also allows such restraints between duly licensed practitioners.
The Michigan statute makes an exception as "to any contract of employment under which
the employer furnishes or discloses to the employee a list of customers or patrons, commonly
called a route list, within certain territory in which such employee is to work, in which con-
tract the employee agrees not to perform similar services in such territory for [himself or]
lar direction in a few other jurisdictions.30 The minority position is well ex-
pressed by a New York court in Kaumnagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co.:
Where... the employee brings to the employment skill previously acquired, and
does not obtain, in the course of his employment, knowledge of methods and processes
which are exclusively within his employer's control and right to use, it cannot be said
that such a restraint is reasonably necessary to the employer's protection .... In
contradistinction to the sale of a business an employee ordinarily receives no considera-
tion other than the fact of present employment; his labor is a fullreturn for his wage. 3r
In the American jurisdictions adhering to this position, employees will not
invariably be permitted to enter into competition with their former employers.
The circumstances in which an employee will be restrained are suggested by
the words of the New York court in the Kaumagraph case. Thus, where the
employee does, in fact, in the course of his employment obtain special knowledge
of the employer's processes and customers, he will be enjoined from unfairly
using such information in competition with his former master. 2 This protec-
tion is wholly independent of the existence of a restrictive covenant (for such
relief is granted in jurisdictions where such covenants are void by statute33);
rather, it results from the exercise of equity's long-recognized power to enjoin
another engaged in a like or accompanying line of business for a period of ninety (go) days
after termination of such contract or services." Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.66 (Henderson, 1938).
Alabama formerly declared the employee's covenant void, but, as amended, the statute
now provides that a vendor or employee may be restrained "from soliciting old customers of
such employer within a specified county, city, or part thereof, so long as the buyer or any
person deriving title to the good will from him, or so long as such employer carries on a like
business therein." Ala. Code, tit. 9, § 23 (1940). This section would seem to allow the assign-
ment of the vendor's covenant but not that of the employee.
30 See Lloyds Employment Corp. v. Kraft, 276 App. Div. io36, 1o36, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 313, 314
(3d Dep't, x95o), where the court said: "The Special Term denied plaintiffs' application
principally on the ground that the negative covenant is valuable only to protect trade secrets
and is unavailable to stifle competition. There are no trade secrets in plaintiffs' business and
no evidence that defendants have been guilty of any breach of confidence." Kaumagraph Co.
v. Stampagraph Co., 235 N.Y. 1, 138 N.E. 485 (1923); Clark Paper & Mfg. Co. v. Stenacher,
236 N.Y. 312, 14o N.E. 708 (1923); Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, i8o N.W. 553
(1920) (semble); Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 223 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. App., 1949)
(semble).
31 Kaumagraph Co. v. Stampagraph Co., 197 App. Div. 66, 76, 188 N.Y. Supp. 678, 685
(ist Dep't, 1923) aff'd 235 N.Y. I, 138 N.E. 585 (1923).
32 Hannigan, The Implied Obligation of an Employee, 77 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 970 (1929);
McClain, Injunctive Relief Against Employees Using Confidential Information, 23 Ky. L.J.
248 (i935); Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks § ISO (i947).
33 Miller Laboratories, Inc. v. Griffin, 200 Okla. 398, 194 P. 2d 877 (1948), annotated in
3 A.L.R. 2d 522 (1948), noted in 2 Okla. L. Rev. 82 (1949); Jewel Tea Co. v. Grissom, 66 S.D.
146, 279 N.W. 544 (1938); MacKenzie Bread Co. v. Huber, 6o Cal. App. 539, 213 Pac. 285
(1929); Glucol Mfg. Co. v. Schulist, 239 Mich. 70, 214 N.W. 152 (1927); Grand Union Tea
Co. v. Dodds, x64 Mich. 50, 128 N.W. ogo (irio). The California cases have gone further
than those of any other jurisdiction in enjoining the solicitation of former customers in the
absence of an express covenant and "may be explained as a successful attempt to evade the
provisions.., of the California Civil Code." Employees' Covenants Not to Solicit Former
Patrons, 20 Cal. L. Rev. 607, 614 n. 29 (1932).
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an employee's betrayal of confidence placed in him by his employer.34 In prac-
tice, this relief is most freely granted when "trade secrets" are in jeopardy be-
cause, it is said, a tangible property right can then be readily discerned; but
realization of the underlying impulse to protect against all breaches of the
employee's fiduciary responsibilities would seem to require abandonment of the
"trade secret" criterion.3 Were courts to rest their decisions on the fundamental
proposition that one should not violate his trust, the absurd necessity of having
to distinguish between a written customer list and one committed to memory
by the employee would be removed.36
This limitation of equitable relief to protection of trade secrets is, of course,
one reason employers insert restrictive covenants in employment contracts.
However, where such covenants are given effect, not only is protection against
an employee's breach of trust made more certain, but the covenant may ex-
tend farther and prohibit competition involving no departure from ordinary
fiduciary principles. This is so because courts are then dealing with a restriction
which by its terms is not limited to the exploitation of knowledge properly be-
longing to the employer. All competition is forbidden if the restraint is "reason-
ably necessary to secure the protection of the business or good will of the em-
ployer."37 Since this is the same test of enforceability applied by courts to the
vendor's covenant which is designed to inhibit competition with the trans-
ferred business,38 it is clear that the result is to obscure the distinction between
the two types of covenants. The employer may be protected against an em-
34 Authorities cited note 32 supra. In Du Pont Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102
(1917), Justice Holmes stated: "The word property as applied to ... trade secrets is an un-
analyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law
makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.... The starting point ... is not
property or due process of law, but that defendant stood in confidential relations with plain-
tiff."
is McClain, Injunctive Relief Against Employees Using Confidential Information, 23 Ky.
L.J. 248, 254-255 (1935), suggests that the relationship originates in a fundamental doctrine
of equity that a person shall not use a confidential relationship at the expense of the other.
36 The employee was not restrained, in the absence of a written list of customers in Progress
Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 K y. 348, 270 S.W. 834 (1925) and Woolley's Laundry, Inc. v.
Silva, 304 Mass. 383, 23 N.E. 2d 899 (1939), noted in 37 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (1939). Contra:
Colonial Laundries, Inc. v. Henry, 48 R.I. 332, i 38 At. 47 (1927). The employee was enjoinedfrom soliciting customers named on a written list in Todd Protectograph Co. v. Hirschberg,
oo N.Y. Misc. 418, x65 N.Y. Supp. 906 (S. Ct., 1917) and Andrews Co. v. Friedman, 26 Pa.
Dist. R. 843 (1917).
37 Chemical Fireproofing Corp. v. Krouse, x55 F. 2d 422, 423 (D.C., 1946). In a footnote
the court indicated that, in general, courts have not accepted the standards for judging the"rea-
sonableness" of restrictions incident to the sale of a business as determinative in the personal
service case. Ibid. But the test of reasonableness is evidently to be retained. Consult authorities
cited note 40 infra. If an employer is "unreasonable" in his clause of restraint, some courts will
enforce it only as to the "reasonable" amount while others will deny all relief, on the theory
that" 'like the dog in the fable, they grasp too much and so lose all.' "Herreshoff v. Boutineas,
17 R.I. 3, 7, Ig Atl. 712, 713 (189o). Consult Noe v. McDevitt, 228 N.C. 242, 45 S.E. 2d 121
(1947), noted in 26 N.C.L. Rev. 402 (1948). On the general subject, consult Fox, The Law of
Master and Servant 127-134 (I95o).
38 Williston, Contracts § x641 (rev. ed., 1937).
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ployee's competition although no trade secret or breach of fiduciary duty is in-
volved. While some courts reach what is in effect a sound result by including in
the "reasonable" category only such restraints as would be enforceable by ordi-
nary fiduciary rules,39 for most courts the issue is not whether the employee
has departed from fiduciary standards but whether the restraint imposed is one
reasonably calculated to protect the business.4O
Thus, as between the parties, the employee's covenant in many American
jurisdictions is enforced in a manner quite similar to that of the vendor. Over-
looked in this process is the change in "relations between employers and em-
ployed" that has been recognized in a few American states. The employer is in
many cases protected against competition which is in no way intensified by
knowledge he has imparted to the employee.
With the employee's covenant thus recognized as a bulwark against com-
petition to the business, courts have not hesitated to analogize it to the ven-
dor's covenant, and so to regard it as an assignable asset of the enterprise.41
The anomalous result ensues that a portion of a nonassignable personal con-
tract is frequently held assignable by American courts. If in the first instance
enforcement of the employee's covenant were restricted to enjoining breaches
of trust,42 which is all that remains of its original underlying justification,
courts might not so freely characterize it an asset. "Ratification" aside, enforce-
ment by an assignee would be more limited.43
39 Renwood Food Products v. Schaefer, 223 S.W. 2d 144, 152 (Mo. App., 1949); Super Maid
Cook-Ware Corp. v. Hamil, 50 F. 2d 83o (C.A. 5th, i93i); Club Aluminum Co. v. Young,
263 Mass. 223, 16o N.E. 804 (1928). Some courts have limited the scope of the covenant by
suggesting that since the services of the defendant were not unique, an injunction should be
refused, extending the rule of Lumley v. Wagner, i De G. & S. 604 (Ch., 1852). Under that
theory, in the absence of trade secrets or lists of customers, the restraint would be rarely en-
forced. Menter Co. v. Brock, 147 Minn. 407, i8o N.W. 553 (1920); Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48
N.J. Eq. 370, 22 AUt. 348 (i8gi). Most courts, however, deem the uniqueness of defendant's
services as immaterial, since the question involved is one of restraint of trade after employment
and not one of "indirect specific performance" during the term of employment. Hollander &
Son v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 66 A. 2d 319 (1949); National Linen Service
Corp. v. Clower, 179 Ga. 136, 175 S.E. 46o (i934). But see Pound, The Progress of the Law,
33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 440 (1920), where it is suggested that the same considerations apply to
covenants of an employee during his service as afterwards, and the test would thus be whether
breach of the negative involves a damage by itself apart from or over and above breach of the
negative.
40 Consult the numerous cases collected in Validity and Enforceability of Restrictive
Covenants, 9 A.L.R. 1456 (1920); 2o A.L.R. 861 (1922); 29 A.L.R. 1331 (1924); 52 A.L.R.
1363 (1928); 67 A.L.R. X002 (1930); 98 A.L.R. 963 (1935); 119 A.L.R. 1452 (1939).
4' Consult authorities cited note 22 supra.
42 This proposal is neither radical nor novel. Consult the Enforceability of a Promise Not
to Compete After An Employment At Will, 29 Col. L. Rev. 347, 352 (1929); Employee's
Covenant Not to Solicit Former Patrons, 20 Calif. L. Rev. 607 (1932), noting Shreveport
Laundries, Inc. v. Teagle, 139 So. 563 (La. App., 1932).
43 It has been held that a trade secret entitles the assignee to enjoin those who have held
confidential relations with the assignor, though they may never have had any connection with
the assignee. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American Can Co., 67 N.J. Eq. 243, 58 AUt. 290 (1904).
But this is a theory quite different from relying on the restrictive covenant as a separate assign-
able asset and one much narrower in scope.
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